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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000462  
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CAPTIONS)

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES  
NSC FOR GAVIN  
LONDON FOR POL - LORD  
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [PHUM](#) [SU](#) [CD](#)  
SUBJECT: JEM ON THE DEFENSIVE

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Summary  
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11. (SBU) Khalil Ibrahim and Secretary of Humanitarian Affairs Suleiman Jamous, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Djibril Ibrahim, Secretary for Administration Abubakar Hamid, Economic Advisor Bushara Suleiman Nour, and Secretary for Finance Azadein Yousif. asked to see Ambassador Nigro and others at Embassy N'Djamena October 20. Key points of Khalil's presentation included:

-- JEM "does not rule out the possibility" of traveling to Doha for the civil society conference being organized by UN/AU Negotiator Bassole.  
-- Still, JEM "must be consulted in advance of the conference," not simply invited as a take-it-or-leave-it gesture, as JEM remains "the most important group on the resistance side."  
-- JEM is concerned that too many international players, and too many individuals with disparate points of view, are being "cultivated" in advance of the civil society conference, and that international negotiators are "impatient" and insistent on "rushing" the process.  
-- JEM is supportive of the conclusions of the U.S.-Sudan policy review, and pleased at recent bilateral progress between Chad and Sudan.  
-- JEM believes that so long as the Chadian rebels continue to cause problems, there will be no regional peace.

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To Play or Not to Play?  
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12. (SBU) Ambassador engaged Khalil using USG policy points provided by S/USSES: the USG was encouraged by Chad's and Sudan's progress toward improving bilateral relations and would view negatively any activity to undermine the GOC-GOS effort; the USG hoped that JEM would participate in the next negotiating meeting in Doha so that its constituency would be represented; the Doha meeting would be an excellent opportunity for JEM to make its views heard. Ambassador summarized key objectives of the new Sudan strategy to Khalil and emphasized that this was the USG's and especially Special

Envoy Graton's "roadmap" for Sudan's future.

¶3. (SBU) JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim sought a meeting with Ambassador Nigro October 20 to lay out his unhappiness with planning for the upcoming Doha civil society conference being organized by UN/AU Negotiator Djibril Bassole. Although Khalil claimed that he was "prepared" to go to Doha, he complained that the GoS "had offered nothing" in the way of concessions in advance of the event; that some ostensible observers from third countries were in fact pro-Sudanese agents; and that so long as "just anybody" was at the negotiating table, JEM might not see fit to participate. Khalil said he hoped to engage in consultations in advance of the Doha round on questions such as who would be invited, as "there is no freedom or civil society in Darfur." According to Khalil, the GoS had been advised that it could bring civil society reps to the Doha event. Why could JEM not bring its own civil society reps? JEM was prepared to play the role of a political movement, as the international community wished, but was concerned that this would make it subordinate to other participants in the conference -- "and such an arrangement is not fair."

¶4. (SBU) Khalil denied that the JEM was receiving significant military assistance from the GoC at present, "although we want to work together with Chad toward peace." Nor did he threaten to withdraw definitively from the Doha process, conceding that to do so "would mean war." Khalil claimed that in the wake of the U.S. Administration's release of its new Sudan policy, "you need our cooperation, just as we need yours." For this reason, the U.S. should "stop trying to rush things" and stop issuing ultimatums. The JEM did not appreciate being cast as "the bad guys," continued Khalil. Djibril Ibrahim added that "we are not happy about being at the table with people who do not belong there; we will not sit down unless there are criteria developed as to who should be at the table." Soulieman Jamous attempted to note that the JEM would agree to sit with other rebel groups "under some conditions," but he was interrupted by Djibril,

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who insisted that JEM would only appear at the table in Doha if there were prior agreement, to which JEM subscribed, on "who gets a seat." The Doha process "was resulting in chaos," Khalil offered. "No one listens."

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Sudan-internal Issues  
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¶5. (SBU) According to Khalil, the JEM sought "unity of our country," and was disturbed by the recent flawed census, which had "multiplied Bashir's supporters 457 times." An election in such circumstances would weaken both the SPLM and movements in the North, harm fragile North-South linkages, and render impossible a free or fair vote. Given that the timetable for the CPA process was already accelerated beyond a point where it would produce a desirable electoral result, the CPA clock should not be used to force developments in Darfur. "Why can't we have peace prior to working on elections?" Khalil asked. Djibril Ibrahim predicted that Darfur would not participate in Sudan elections in any case if these were held prematurely. "Instead of unity, you will get separation" between either the North and South, or Darfur and the rest of Sudan, said Djibril.

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Conclusion  
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¶6. (SBU) Khalil reiterated that he "wanted to cooperate" with the U.S. and international community in advance of the Doha round. He stressed that there had been "lost opportunities" in recent weeks, and that the U.S. should "be more patient." Ambassador Nigro agreed to convey Khalil's views to Washington and advise of any response.

17. (U) Minimize considered.  
NIGRO